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In the considerable volume of economic literature on public enter- 
prise, one area appears to have been largely overlooked: the impact of 
public enterprise investment on economic stability. This omission is 
somewhat surprising, because for several decades economists have 
demonstrated a growing interest in the relationship of other govern- 
mental expenditures and revenues to economic stability. Most of that 
literature is concerned with the effect of central government budget 
changes, although in some countries the relationship of state and local 
government budgets to economic stability has also been studied, and, 
of course, the automatic or built-in stabilizing effects of social security 
systems have long been recognized. 
The lack of study of the stabilizing effects of public enterprise 
investment may be due in part to the belief that investment is primarily 
determined by reasons that have little to do with conjunctural consid- 
erations, and that anyway its determination is largely outside the in- 
fluence of the central government. Both positions are open to question, 
and in any case public enterprise investment does have a de facto 
impact, the importance of which is worth studying regardless of whether 
the government uses or is capable of using it as one means of attempting 
to achieve economic stability. 
Our purpose in this paper is to determine the extent to which public 
enterprise investment was a sta'bilizing or destabilizing factor during 
the eleven-year period from 1955 through 1965 for six countries: 
Belgium, France, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.l The methods of estimating the impact of that investment are 
* I am particularly indebted to J.C.R. Dow, who conceived and directed the OECD 
study of fiscal policy [4J, and to Bent Hansen, with whom I had the pleasure of working 
for two years on completing it. I also benefitted from the helpful editorial assistance of 
Janet Eckstein. 
1 A seventh country, Germany, was included in the Hansen study, but no complete data 
are available concerning its public enterprise investments. 
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the same as those developed for a recent OECD survey by Bent 
Hansen [3], which gives the institutional background for budgetary 
action and analyzes the nature and effects of fiscal policy for seven 
OECD member countries between 1955 and 1965. This paper supple- 
ments the Hansen study by singling out public enterprise investment. 
I. Measuring the Effects of Public Enterprise Investment 
The model developed by Hansen to measure the effects of various 
types of budget changes draws on the previous contribution of 
Brown [ l ] ,  Hansen [4], Lindbeck [5], and Musgrave [6]. Although 
Hansen’s model is admittedly simple compared with the large econo- 
metric models which have been developed for some countries (partly 
because he wanted to use a common analysis for each country), it is 
adequate to measure the relative importance of various kinds of budget 
changes both within and among countries. Because there were no 
quarterly data for some countries, his model uses year-to-year changes, 
and no lags are introduced. The model assumes that private invest- 
ment, exports, and prices are exogenously determined. Imports are 
endogenous and for some countries (e.g., Belgium and Sweden) repre- 
sent the principal leakage of potential budget effects. 2 
The combination of the direct and the multiplier effects, or the total 
effects, of budget changes are estimated by the following equation: 
1 
1 --a(l+) 
Total effects = [dI + a(1-P) (IdPdl 
where a is the marginal propensity to consume, P is the marginal pro- 
pensity to import, dI is the annual change in the volume of public enter- 
prise investment, and Idp, is the annual change in the value of public 
enterprise investment due to price changes. The leakage coefficients a 
and IA vary, of course, among countries, and consequently the multipliers 
for the effects due to changes in the volume and price of public enter- 
prise investment differ also. These multipliers allow only for leakages 
via private savings and imports, and exclude leakages via tax changes 
and spending induced by the changes in public enterprise investment 
itself. The effects of tax changes are excluded, because they are 
included in the impact of general or central government, which is 
discussed later. I f  leakages due to tax changes were explicitly included, 
the effects of public enterprise investment would be diminished for each 
country but its relative position among the countries would not be 
affected. 
2 For a complete description of the methods used to measure budgetary effects, see 
Hansen 141, Chapter 1. 
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The year-to-year variations in the total effects of changes in public 
enterprise investment, expressed as a percentage of GNP, are given in 
Table 1. Before we evaluate whether these have been generally stabi- 
lizing or not, several comments may be helpful. Several factors account 
for differences in the typical impact, whether expansionary or dam- 
pening, among countries: the relative size of the public enterprise sector 
and its annual investment, and the relative importance of those two 
multipliers. For example, France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
all have large public enterprise sectors whose investment normally 
exceeds 5 per cent of GNP, but the typical impact was nearly 2 per cent 
of GNP in France and only about 0.5 per cent in Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. The difference is due partly to the more rapid 
expansion of the public enterprise sector in France, but it is also due 
to the smaller multiplier effects in Sweden and the United Kingdom, 
where import leakages substantially reduce the potential effects of 
public enterprise investment. The public enterprise sector expanded 
most rapidly in Italy, where its investment increased from 2 per cent 
of GNP in 1955 to 4 per cent in 1965. As the sector was relatively small 
in 1955, the average impact was not as large as in France, but it did 
amount to about 1 per cent of GNP annually, the second highest among 
the countries studied. In Belgium the public enterprise sector was 
smaller than in the countries already mentioned and did not change 
much during the period covered. In fact, the average impact amounted 
to only about 0.1 per cent of GNP. The same was true in the United 
States, where the public enterprise sector was by far the smallest among 
the countries studied, and where investment amounted to less than 0.5 
per cent of GNP. Year-to-year changes were often important, especially 
when the large multiplier effects are included, so that a typical impact 
amounted to about 0.5 per cent of GNP, although the numerous times 
when the effect was dampening more than compensated for the expan- 
sionary effects which resulted in the average effect having a slight 
dampening impact. 
11. Evaluating the Impact of Public Enterprise Investment 
No single criterion is clearly the only on,e by which the impact of 
public enterprise investment on economic stability can be judged. Three 
of the possible criteria are discussed in this paper. The first evaluation 
attempts to judge the short-run stabilizing effects by simply determining 
whether the actual growth rate of GNP would have been more or less 
stable without the impact of public enterprise investment. Figure 1 
illustrates the relevant relationships which are necessary in order to 
make this assessment: the average GNP-growth rate, the actual rate, 
and a measure of how GNP might have developed in the absence of 
the impact of any public enterprise investment (but including the bud- 
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local government and the social security system-as well as the com- 
bined influence of all other exogenous and endogenous factors). The 
latter measure is obtained by subtracting the total effects of public 
enterprise investment from the actual GNP growth rate (see Table 2). 
For example, in Belgium during 1955 the total effects amounted to 
+0.5 per cent of GNP and, ceteris paribus, contributed to pushing the 
actual growth rate that much higher above the average rate than it 
otherwise would have been-by  definition a case where the budget impact 
was destabilizing. 
The net stabilizing (or destabilizing) effect over a number of years 
is simply the accumulated sum of the (gross) stabilizing minus the 
destabilizing effects; these and other relevant data are given in Table 2. 
The net effects were stabilizing in only two countries, France and the 
United States, and on balance they had a destabilizing impact in the 
remaining four countries, Belgium, Italy, Sweden, and the United King- 
dom. It must be immediately noted, however, that on average the net 
effects were generally quite small, amounting to no more than 0.1 per 
cent of GNP annually except in France, where they were more than 
1 per cent, and the United Kingdom, where they were about 0.3 per cent. 
TABLE 11. THE ACCUMULATED STABILIZING EFFECTS 
OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE INVESTMENT, 1955-65 
Belgium France United United Kingdom States 
expressed as % of GNP,, 
1. Net stabilizing effects of 
public enterprise investment 4 . 9  12.5 4 . 8  -1.6 -3.2 0.2 
a. Gross stabilizing . . . . 1.0 16.0 5.6 2.4 1.4 3.2 
b. Destabilizing , . . . . . 1.9 3.5 6.4 4.0 4.6 3.0 
relation to “pure cycle” . . 0.1 6.7 -2.6 1.2 -3.2 0.6 
a. Gross stabilizing . . . . 1.5 13.1 4.7 3.8 1.4 3.4 
b. Destabilizing . . . . . . 1.4 6.4 7.3 2.6 4.6 2.8 
“pure cycle” . . . . . . . . . 24.3 20.9 19.9 22.7 11.6 48.7 
2. Net stabilizing effect in 
3. Potential stabilization for 
expressed as 96 
4. Percentage of potential sta- 
bilization achieved . . . .. 24 45 29 40 -23 41 
a. General government . . 24 13 42 35 5 40 
b. Public enterprise invest- 
ment . .  . .  . . . .  . .  . .  0 32 -13 5 -28 1 
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In general, the rather small net effects resulted from stronger (gross) 
stabilizing effects being diminished by even larger destabilizing effects 
in particular years. France again is an exception, as the stabilizing 
effects were very large and were relatively little diminished by years 
when the effects were destabilizing. Figure 1 makes clear how little 
public enterprise investment influenced economic developments in Bel- 
gium, Sweden, and the United States, and how substantially they altered 
the course of events in France and Italy; the destabilizing nature of the 
effects in the United Kingdom is also evident. 
This first criterion for evaluating the net stabilizing effects is most 
relevant in those countries in which (a) public enterprise investments 
are strongly influenced by government policy, and (b) this policy is part 
of the general conjunctural economic policies. Understandably, our 
six countries vary considerably in these respects. The central govern- 
ment of France maintains the greatest degree of control, which perhaps 
helps to explain why public enterprise investment was a stronger stabi- 
lizing factor there than in any other country. Belgium and the United 
Kingdom also maintain rather close control, but they allow a greater 
degree of autonomy in the investment decisions of public enterprises 
than does France. In Italy, where the public enterprise sector has 
grown rapidly in importance, the central government has relatively little 
direct control, except in the case of some public utilities companies, 
because self-financing provides about 90 per cent of the investment 
funds. In Sweden, the central government controls rather closely the 
investment of public enterprises which belong directly to it, but these 
are few in number and importance; most of the enterprises belong to 
local government, and the influence over investment decisions is only 
indirect, through general credit market policies. The same is true of 
the United States, but the enterprises belonging directly to the central 
government are so few and small in importance that no separate data 
about their investments are published. We do know, however, that 
aside from the stockpiling of strategic materials by the central govern- 
ment, nearly all U.S. public enterprise investment is made by companies 
responsible to state and local authorities. Because of these substantial 
differences among the countries studied, it is not at all clear that the 
basis for appraising the stabilizing effects should be the impact on 
potential fluctuations in the GNP growth rate, given all other budget 
effects and exogenous influences. 
A second possible comparison gives different results for some coun- 
tries. We can ask whether in the absence of any budget changes the 
net effect of changes in public enterprise investment alone has been 
generally stabilizing or destabilizing. In order to answer this it is 
necessary to construct a series for GNP growth as it might have 
developed without any budget impact, by subtracting from actual GNP 
growth the total effect of all budget changes (public enterprise invest- 
ment as well as general government). This hypothetical series is called 
the “pure cycle”, because it attempts to estimate what GNP growth 
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would have been if there had been no change in any government expen- 
ditures or revenues from one year to the next. The pure cycle still 
incorporates the effects of other government policies (e.g., monetary and 
direct controls) as well as of autonomous forces (e.g., private invest- 
ment and exports) and endogenous mechanisms (e.g., leakages through 
private saving and imports). Hence the pure cycle is not so “pure”, 
but it nevertheless is a useful analytical tool. Additional graphs illus- 
trating the pure cycle and the relationships similar to those included in 
Figure 1 are not presented here, because the lines intersect to such a 
degree that interpreting them becomes more difficult than the help they 
might provide, but several interesting relationships to the pure cycle 
can be derived, and these accumulated effects are also included in 
Table 2. 
Potential stabilization can be defined as  the (absolute) difference 
between the pure cycle and the average GNP growth rate ; potential 
stabilization for the period 1955-65 is simply the accumulated sum of 
these annual differences. The effects are defined as stabilizing if  they 
make GNP growth closer to the average than it would have been without 
them; otherwise they are destabilizing. The accumulated amount of 
potential stabilization (item 3) is roughly the same for four countries, 
Belgium, France, Italy, and Sweden; somewhat less for the United King- 
dom; and considerably greater for the United States (it is well known 
that cyclical fluctuations, actual as well as potential, have been sub- 
stantially larger in the U.S. than in the European countries). 
Next the net stabilizing effects of public enterprise investment in 
relation to the pure cycle (item 2) can be calculated and then compared 
with the net effects already described (item 1). Although in every case 
the absolute amount of net stabilization differs according to which 
criteria are used, nevertheless for France, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States the general direction of the effects remains un- 
changed, That is to say, under both criteria for France and the United 
States the net effects were on balance stabilizing, while they were 
destabilizing for Italy and the United Kingdom. For Belgium, the few 
destabilizing effects which were calculated by the first method disappear 
when the impact of public enterprise investment is compared with the 
pure cycle, and for Sweden the net effects switch from somewhat 
destabilizing to somewhat stabilizing. 
Item 4 shows the amount of potential stabilization achieved by the 
entire public sector; it is significant that a fair amount of stabilization 
was achieved in all countries except the United Kingdom, where the 
impact of all budget changes tended to be destabilizing on balance-a 
quantitative evaluation of the effects of the “stop/go” policies. Except 
for France and the United Kingdom, public enterprise investment played 
a minor role; most of the stabilizing effects must be attributed to the 
general government (item 4b). 
There is a third criterion by which stabilization could be judged: in 
relation to potential output. The percentage of short-run stabilization 
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achieved can differ substantially from what was accomplished in main- 
taining an economy’s full economic potential. The United States is a 
good example, because while the amount of short-run stabilization was 
considerable, nevertheless during the period from 1955 to 1965 the econ- 
omy continually functioned below its full  potential. Hence by this 
criterion, the judgments of the stabilizing effects of public enterprise 
investment in the U.S. would have to be revised. As their absolute 
impact was so small (see Table l), however, this is not an important 
consideration. All the European countries except Italy tended to run 
at nearly full or even over-full potential, so that judging the stabilizing 
impact of their public enterprise investment would not be greatly 
affected by this new criterion, For Italy, however, the economy’s full  
potential was not reached until about 1962 or 1963. Thus, it would have 
been possible for economic growth to have been higher than the actual 
average. This means that the destabilizing effects of public enterprise 
investment, which were due to a generally overexpansive character, 
would need to be revised downwards-at least up to 1962. It is worth 
noting, however, that the expansionary effects caused by public enter- 
prise investment tended to increase throughout the period, although as  
the Italian economy approached closer to its full  potential it would 
have been (better if the expansionary impact had become increasingly 
smaller. After 1962 public enterprise investment had a definitely desta- 
bilizing impact in Italy. 
111. Summary and Conclusions 
It is possible to use several criteria to appraise the stabilizing or 
destabilizing impact of public enterprise investment. For some coun- 
tries this makes it impossible to say conclusively whether the net effect 
was stabilizing or destabilizing, but we can at least attempt a reason- 
able evaluation for the six countries studied. 
France is the only country for which by all three criteria the impact 
of public enterprise investment appears to have been definitely stabi- 
lizing. In the United States, the public enterprise sector is very small 
and its investment is almost entirely independent of government control. 
Nevertheless, changes in investment contributed to stability in the short 
run, but a greater overall expansionary impact would have been more 
desirable, since a higher level of demand would have helped the 
economy to function closer to its full potential. In Italy the short-run 
effects of public enterprise investment were definitely destabilizing, but 
this was due primarily to excessive expansion and viewed from the 
perspective of the economy’s capacity to have grown more rapidly (at 
least up to 1962-63), the impact was probably a positive rather than a 
destabilizing factor. It seems clearer that, by all three criteria, the 
impact of changes in public enterprise investment after 1962 was desta- 
bilizing. For Belgium and Sweden, judgment must be reserved, because 
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in both cases the effect of public enterprise investment was somewhat 
destabilizing if the impact of all other government budget changes is  
taken as given but stabilizing if it is compared with what might have 
occurred in the absence of all government budget changes. In both 
countries, however, public enterprise investment was relatively small and 
had little influence on the course of economic events. 
In sum, the impact of public enterprise investment was destabilizing 
only in the case of the United Kingdom, while for the other five countries 
it was  generally a stabilizing factor, albeit a small one except in 
France, where it had an important stabilizing influence. 
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